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Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,  
619 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (Miccosukee I) 
 
and 
 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States,  
619 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2010) (Miccosukee II). 
Jesse Froehling 
ABSTRACT 
In Miccosukee I, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers wanted to build a bridge along the 
Tamiani Trail that would, in effect, flood part of the reservations of the Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians of Florida.  The Tribe sued the Corps alleging that the construction of the bridge would 
violate the National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.  
The court concluded that a ―notwithstanding‖ clause in a Congressional appropriations act 
overrode environmental procedural laws.  After Miccosukee I, the tribe sued the U.S. Department 
of Transportation, alleging procedural violations in the construction of the bridge.  Once again, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, because a 
similar ―notwithstanding‖ clause deprived the court of the discretion to curb Congress‘ intent.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 After a highway through the Florida Everglades proved detrimental to the surrounding 
environment, Congress required the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to build a mile-long 
bridge to improve water flow through an integral part of the Everglades.
398
  In Miccosukee I, the 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (the Tribe) filed suit against the Corps alleging violation 
                                                          
398
 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 619 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (hereinafter 
Miccosukee I). 
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of numerous environmental procedural statutes.
399
  The Tribe worried, in essence, that 
construction of the bridge would allow the Everglades to flood its reservations.
400
  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that a general repealing clause in the language of the Omnibus Act of 2009 deprived 
the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
401
  In Miccosukee II, decided the same 
day, the Tribe alleged the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) violated transportation 
procedural statutes.
402
  Following the same reasoning it outlined in Miccosukee I, the court again 
held that the Omnibus Act deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 
II.  MICCOSUKEE I 
A. Historical Background 
 The Miccosukee Tribe‘s ancestors may have arrived in the southeastern United States 
about 10,000 years ago
403
 – 5,000 years before geological shifts formed the Everglades.404  In 
1962, Congress officially recognized the Tribe, and today, tribal members live on several 
reservations scattered throughout the vast Floridian swamp, which covers much of the state south 
of Orlando.
405
 
 Historically, water flowed from the Kissimmee River to Lake Okeechobee, then 
southwest to Florida Bay.
406
  Between the lake and the bay, the land slopes just three inches per 
mile, creating a thirty-mile wide river gradually flowing south, though in bad weather the flow is 
quite noticeable.
407
  In 1928, the river breached the Okeechobee levy and drowned more than 
                                                          
399
 Id. at 1294. 
400
 Id. 
401
 Id. at 1303 (citing Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (2009)). 
402
 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S., 619 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (hereinafter Miccosukee II). 
403
 Miccosukee I, 619 F.3d at 1292 n. 2. 
404
 Id. at 1292. 
405
 Id. 
406
 Id. 
407
 Id. 
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2,000 farm workers.
408
  Twenty years later, Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which 
authorized the control of flooding in the Everglades.
409
 
 The Tamiami Trail (the Trail) was the first highway to cross the Everglades.
410
  Though 
Interstate 75 to the north now carries more vehicles than the Trail, the Trail remains a vital road 
and hurricane evacuation route.
411
  A portion of the Trail runs along the northern boundary of 
Everglades National Park; it dams water, restricting water flow into the Park and into the Shark 
River Slough, the main water corridor of the Everglades.
412
  The restricted water flow posed a 
significant environmental threat, causing ―vast losses‖ of wading birds, fish, and native plants.413 
B. Procedural Background 
Congress responded to environmental obligations in 1989 with the Everglades National 
Park Protection and Expansion Act
414
 and again in 2000 with the Water Resources Development 
Act.
415
  In 2008, the Corps concluded that the most ―effective and economical‖ option for 
improving water flow was to replace a piece of the Trail with a bridge.
416
  The same month the 
Corps issued its conclusion, the Tribe sued the Corps alleging violations of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
417
 the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),
418
 and the 
Water Resources Development Act (WRDA).
419
  The lawsuit alleged that the Corps failed to 
adhere to environmental laws during the planning phase, failed to prepare adequate 
                                                          
408
 Id. at 1292-93. 
409
 Id. at 1293. 
410
 Id. 
411
 Id. 
412
 Id. 
413
 Id. 
414
 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 410r-5 (2006)). 
415
 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2201). 
416
 Id. at 1294. 
417
 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4321). 
418
 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. Appendix 2). 
419
 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat. 2572, 2680 (2000). 
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environmental impact statements, and that the increased water levels would flood tribal lands.
420
  
The Tribe sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
421
 and 
requested an injunction to halt construction of the bridge.
422
 
 In September 2008, Congress passed an appropriations act containing a section that 
required the Corps to immediately implement the bridge option.
423
  A month later, the Tribe filed 
a second lawsuit against the Corps and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) alleging 
violations of the Endangered Species Act.
424
  The Tribe alleged that the FWS‘s biological 
opinion did not adequately address the threat to the endangered snail kite and wood stork 
species.
425
  Like in the prior NEPA case, the Tribe sought an injunction blocking the construction 
of the bridge.
426
  Meanwhile, the Corps moved to dismiss the NEPA case, citing the 2008 
Appropriations Act that required it to begin construction immediately.
427
  The court sided with 
the Tribe and held the Act lacked the specificity required to exempt the Corps from NEPA.
428
  
Shortly thereafter, the court issued the Tribe‘s requested injunction.429 
In March 2009, Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, which included 
essentially the same language as its predecessor, but added the clause, ―notwithstanding any 
other provisions of law.‖430  The clause proved to be the language on which the court made its 
decision; when the Corps filed a motion to dismiss, the court granted it, holding that the 
                                                          
420
 Id. 
421
 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 500). 
422
 Id. 
423
 Id. 
424
 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531). 
425
 Id. 
426
 Id. 
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 Id. at 1294-95. 
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 Id. at 1295. 
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Omnibus Act was an ―explicit exemption‖ from NEPA and FACA.431  The Corps filed a copy of 
the judgment with the court evaluating the Tribe‘s ESA allegations, and that court, using the 
same reasoning, also dismissed the Tribe‘s claim.432  The Tribe appealed the following day.433   
C. Analysis 
 The court sought to determine ―whether the Omnibus Act modifie[d] NEPA, FACA, and 
ESA for purposes of the Tribe‘s lawsuits and thereby deprived federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the Tribe‘s claims.‖434  Appropriations acts, the court stated, may effectively 
repeal older statutes through explicit repeals, general repealing clauses, and implied repeals.
435
  
An explicit repeal identifies outright the statute it is repealing.
436
  In the absence of an explicit 
repeal, a general repealing clause, such as ―notwithstanding any other federal law,‖ may be 
sufficient.
437
  Lastly, an implied repeal focuses on Congressional intent; while the new statute 
does not identify the statute being repealed, the Legislature‘s intent to repeal may be inferred 
where a new statute conflicts with an earlier statute.
438
 
The Tribe argued the Omnibus Act was neither an explicit repeal, because Congress failed to 
articulate any statute it was repealing, nor an implied repeal, because the Corps failed to 
demonstrate the necessary Congressional intent.
439
  The Corps countered that the 
―notwithstanding‖ clause plainly indicated Congress‘ intent to override preexisting 
environmental statutes.
440
  The court held that the ―notwithstanding‖ clause was a general 
                                                          
431
 Id. 
432
 Id. 
433
 Id. 
434
 Id. at 1296. 
435
 Id. 
436
 Id. (citing 1A Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23:7 (7th ed. 2010)). 
437
 Id. at 1297. 
438
 Id. at 1299. 
439
 Id. at 1296. 
440
 Id. at 1295-96. 
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repealing clause that overrode the controlling environmental statutes upon which the Tribe had 
rested its claims.
441
 
Firstly, the phrase ―shall . . . construct or cause to be constructed‖ in the notwithstanding 
clause spoke directly to any law regulating construction of the bridge.
442
  Secondly, the Omnibus 
Act contained an immediacy clause — ―immediately and without further delay‖— which 
indicated Congress wanted the bridge built instantly.
443
  Lastly, the word ―shall,‖ directing that 
―the Corps shall build the bridge,‖ denied the Corps any discretion in the matter.444  Reasoning 
that procedural statutes do not apply when an agency lacks discretion to act, the court concluded 
Congress‘ command to build the bridge precluded the applicability of NEPA, FACA, and the 
ESA.
445
  The court also found that by mandating the bridge‘s construction, Congress transformed 
an administrative decision into a legislative decision, barring the Tribe from seeking judicial 
review of the agency action.
446
  Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court and held the 
Omnibus Act deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case.
447
 
III.  MICCOSUKEE II 
A. Procedural Background 
 After the Tribe lost Miccosukee I, it brought a separate action, alleging in Counts I and II 
that the DOT violated its statutory procedures and the APA.
448
  Specifically, the Tribe alleged 
that the DOT failed to conduct a mandatory review of the bridge‘s impact on federal parkland 
before transferring a Highway Easement Deed to the Florida Department of Transportation as 
                                                          
441
 Id. at 1300. 
442
 Id.  
443
 Id. at 1301. 
444
 Id. at 1302. 
445
 Id. 
446
 Id. 
447
 Id. at 1302. 
448
 Miccosukee II, 619 F.3d at 1287 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)). 
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required by Section 4(f) of the relevant DOT‘s statutory procedures.449  The Tribe also alleged in 
Count III that in making the transfer, the DOT exceeded its statutory authority to use federal land 
―reasonably necessary for the right-of-way of any highway,‖ because the Highway Easement 
Deed was not for highway purposes.
450
  Lastly, the Tribe alleged in Count IV that the transfer of 
the Highway Easement Deed violated the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion 
Act because it reduced the acreage of the park and violated the Tribe‘s substantive due process 
rights to use the land where the bridge would be constructed.
451
  Again, the Tribe sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief to halt construction.
452
 
 The district court dismissed the Tribe‘s procedural claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and held that the bridge‘s construction did not violate the Tribe‘s due process rights 
or the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act.
453
  Once again, the Tribe 
appealed.
454
 
B. Analysis 
 The court returned to the ―notwithstanding‖ clause it relied upon in Miccosukee I to 
dismiss the Tribe‘s claims against the DOT.455  Reasoning the verb ―construct‖ is, if anything, 
even closer than the connection with laws regulating the environmental implications of agency 
action, the court held the Omnibus Act‘s ―notwithstanding‖ clause deprived the DOT of 
discretion and the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
456
  Specifically, the court determined: 
This repeal precludes any possibility that a federal court may entertain an action 
seeking to delay or review that project, whether that review occurs under the laws 
governing the U.S. DOT, the APA, or other statutory authority.  The delay 
                                                          
449
 Id. 
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 Id (citing 23 U.S.C. § 317). 
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 Id. at 1288. 
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inherent in any review of administrative action poses a direct conflict to 
Congress‘ clear statutory command that the Corps build the bridge ‗immediately 
and without further delay.‘457 
 
This conclusion compelled the court to hold that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
regarding the Tribe‘s allegations of procedural violations under Counts I and II.458  Likewise, the 
court required the district court to dismiss Counts III and IV for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.
459
  Regarding the alleged substantive due process violation, the court held that the 
Tribe ―failed to sufficiently plead deprivation of any non-statutory right in a way that would 
invoke the jurisdiction of the district court,‖ and therefore it did not have jurisdiction.460 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Miccosukee I and II present an ironic dichotomy.  Elevating the Omnibus Act above 
agency-based environmental regulation may likely preserve the Tribe‘s age-old aboriginal 
environment at the expense of flooding its reservations.  Regardless of the Tribe‘s plight, perhaps 
the most troubling aspect of this case is the holding that Congress may override environmental 
mainstays such as NEPA and the ESA with a simple clause inserted deep in the pages of an 
appropriations bill.  However, the court‘s reasoning is sound because precedent clearly indicates 
that Congress may, and in fact did, place the necessity of the bridge above its negative 
environmental impact.  Congress may not interfere with judicial proceedings, but the 
consequences of the Omnibus Act prohibited the tribe‘s appeal from going forward.  And if that 
is to change, it must fall to Congress, once again, to craft a law that provides the Tribe with 
subject matter jurisdiction to bring its appeal. 
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